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COMPARATIVE SIM LJLATION ANALYSIS OF
SOCIAL SECURIIY SYSlEMS
BY JAMES I-I. Stiiiui.z
Increases in price levels and general standards of living afleet the relative positions of those n'ceivin
social security benefits. After distinguishing the earnings replacement June! jon oJ social .eeduritv from
basic incamne support. 1/u' author contrasts tin' approach taken in the Caned States with Jireign SislemnS.
A simulation methodology for examining the efiecis of formula changes on benefits is then described.
A West German type formula is contrasted with tutu used in the United States social security system.
with the former hating as an explicit goal for retired induiduals. living tiandurds iluth are current/i
e,uored hr workers of equivalent status. The simulation findings are then presented and discuised for
both systems in terms of retirement benefit levels and their ratios to the average of i/ic last ten rears
of earnings.
INTRODUCTION
In a recent report by a "task force" studying the economic problems of growing
old, the basic retirement preparation problem is succinctly stated:
Every American---whether poor or rich, black or white, uneducated or
college-trainedfaces a common aging problem: How can he provide and
plan for a retirement period of indeterminate length and uncertain needs'?
How can he allocate earnings during his working lifetime so that he not only
meets current obligations .. but has somethingleft over for his own old
age? (U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging, 1969.)
This basic economic problem must he dealt with by all persons before the
retirement period. Today, older persons in the United States are increasingly
likely to find themselves "automatically" retired at a certain age from their
regular job, without viable alternative work opportunities. At the same time.
over the years that follow their departure from the labor force, they are faced
with the prospect of expenditure needs which do tb! decrease very significantly.
In the retirement period there usually are rising health expenditures, increased
leisure activities, and increased need for supportive services. And there is a
continuing desire or need for "regular" goods and services at levels not greatly
diminished from preretirement consumption levels.
The aged must also deal with the general rising level of prices which is almost
certain to occur throughout the retirement period. Moreover, the retired quickly
become aware of the rising living standards of most non-retired families---as these
younger families share in the general, long-run economic growth of the country.
Such increases no doubt generate a desire among many, if not most. of the aged
to "keep up."
All these factors when viewed together indicate that there are strong economic
pressures on persons when they retire which make their perceived "needs" in
*T he work reported on here is part of a larger project concerned with a comparative arsahsis of
five social security systems. This project is supported by the Levi nson Gerontologicat Policy Institute.
Brandeis University. In addition, financial support for some of the simulation analysis was provided
under contract with the Office of Research and Statistics. US. Social Security Administration.
Presented at the NBER Conference on the Role of the Computer in Economic and Social Research
in Latin America. Cuernavaca. Mcico. 1971
109retirement not much different from those just prior to retirementWhether an
individual's resources in retirement will be adequate to meet thissitnatioii depends
on what sort of life style he wants in retirement, but, more importantly,it depends
upon the economic preparations which have been made beforeretirement and which make the desired life style possible.
in recent decades, as many countries have reactedto the widespreadpoverty among the aged portion of the population, we have seen increasedreliance placed
upon institutional or collective means of providing economicresources for old
age. Collective arrangements are not new, however; peoplesince earliesttimes have attempted to mitigate or eliminate economicinsecurity by bandingtogether in groups--families, tribes, associations, guilds--to"share" income andgoods. What is new is the increased importance of industrialand government actionin this area. As Kenneth Boulding (1958) hasobserved:
It is when the "sharing group" becomestoo sinai! toensure that there will always be enough producers iiiit to support theunproductive that devices for...insurance... become necessary. When the "sharing group"
is small there is always a danger that sheer accidentwill bring theproportion of earners to non-earners toa level at which the group cannotfunction. For example, during the thirtiesand the postwar period,signifIcant changes in retirement security provision tookplace in the United States.Social Security eligibility has now been extended(along with higher benefits)to all but a very small minority of the regular workforce. At the sante time,the fluniber ofPersons participating in private pension plaitshas mushroomed toa point where more than 28 million workersare now covered by private pensionand deferred profit- sharing plans, about 50percent of the industrial labor force.
The growth of public andprivate pension plans hashad a significant effect on the incomes of older persons. Interms of the U.S. Social SecurityAdministra [ion's poverty index, thepercentage of American aged couplesliving below the poverty line declined from 30percent in 1959 to 17percent in 1969. And the percentage of poor oldpersons living alone or withnon-relatives declined from 66 percent to 49percent during the same period.
The economic situationof the elderly hasimproved considerablyBut, at the same time, the dataclearly indicate that thereis still a sizeable numberof aged living under seriouseconomic hardship. Moreover,there seem to beincreased numbers of personsdissatisfied with thefunctioning and results ofthe existing pension mechanisms And,as a consequence discussionand analyses continue with a view todeveloping and perfectingmore Workable and equitablepension mechanisms
There now seemsto be a generalacceptance in the United States thatincomes should be raisedas soon as possible loanagreed upon poverty levelfor Americans of all ages who donot adequately share inthe Nation'seconomic abundance. Hopefully, it willnot be too long beforeprivate and publicpension systems together withsupplementary welfareprograms where necessary ---willinsure all the ageda minimum level ofincome which will beadequate to provide for their most basic needs.
As the UnitedStates takes thisgiant step in providing'nini,nwn economic Security to allAmericans, a new lookat our economicprograms for the retired
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taged seems timely. In evaluating present pension systems, it is important to keep
in mind the basic economic question ol' how much income is to be allocatedby
persons in their younger years, either individually orin groups, for retirement
preparation purposes. For example, the United States has accepted in the design
of its current social security system the concept that the current generationof
workers provides the funds via payroll taxes to provide current retireeswith
pensionsin return for a promise of similar pension support from future workers.
At the same time, there is no political consensus as to what that level of support
for various groups of the aged should be.
In addition to the aged who have a/nays lived in povertyand the aged who
find themselves for thefirsttime in poverty because of inadequate pensions. there
are many aged families abate the povertylevel whose earnings during worklife
allowed them a comfortable living standard but whose retirementincomes have
dropped far below their preretireinent levels. Their income problem growsout of
the cessation of earnings of one or more family members and thefailure of their
savings and/or private and public pensions to replace a sufficientlylarge pro-
portion of these earnings.
In the United States, social security old-age benefits are related toprior
earnings up to a specified earnings ceiling. Computation of thesebenefits, there-
fore, is affected not only by changes in the benefit formulabut also by changes in
"creditable earnings" ceiling and the period of' years of averageearnings upon
which benefits are based. A recent estimate of the replacement rate orpension-
earnings ratio provided by the system has been made by the U.S. SocialSecurity
Administration's Office of Research and Statistics (Horlich. 1970). Thereplace-
ment of earnings in the year before retirementby a social security retirement
pensionfor asinglemale full-time industrial it'orkertt'it/iarerageearnings in
manufacturingretiring at age 65 in 1968 was 29 percent. The replacement rate
for a similar worker who had a wife who was at least aged 65and receiving a
spouse benefit was 44 percent.
The above rates are based upon preretirement earnings defined asearnings
in the year before retirement. If the measure of preretirementearnings is defined
to be average earnings during the 1950-1968period and excluding the 5 years.
1950-1955, of lowest earnings, the replacement rate for asingle male worker
rises from 29 percent to 38 percent. Such replacement rates differsignificantly
from the 60 to 75 percent replacement rates necessary to maintainliving standards
if other financial resources are not available
It can be argued that both private and public pension systemsin the U.S.
have badly satisfied the relative adequacy standard (i.e.,adequate earnings
replacement) for thenon-poorbecause of three major factors:
I. U.S. pension systems (especially the social security system) arepurposely
biased in favor of low wage earners.
Most U.S. public and private pension systems fail toexplicitly take into
account the increases in the general level of priceswhich occur before and
after retirement.
U.S. pension systems do not provide any formalmechanism for taking
account of economic growth and the resultingimproved general living
standards which result.
IllRegarding the first !actor. theU.S.social security system hasa minimum
benefIt, a benefit formula weighted in favor of lowearners, and a creditable
earnings ceihng which does not adjust automatically. l'hse ftatiii-es°l)era te with
theobjectiveof helping to provide ''socially adeuuate'' incometo the low n'e.'
aged. But they also operate. as a consequence, to keep thereplacement levels for
the non-poor low.
While one cannot generalize about private pensionsystems as easily because
of the large number of independent systems and thewide diversity ofprovisiomis it has been observed by l-leidhreder, Kolodruhet,.,and Skolnikl%6) thit
collectively bargained plans tend to provide uniformbenefits thatvary by lengiI
of service but not earnings---thus placing low-paidworkers in anadvantageo5 position. Minimum benefit provisions in privateplans with
formulas also tend to favor the below-averagewage earner
Regarding the second l'actor, adjustmentfor price increases, U_s.social security benefits paid in retirenwnt have beenadjusted frequently by(.ong ess to keep paceith price level increases- -sometimes, however, after a considerable
time lag between the price change and the benefitincrease At the time theiniija/ social security benefit is calculated fora retiring employee, howevei, thebenefit ised upon average earnings whichinclude the worker's earlierearnings which were paid at a time when the price levelwas much lower. Thus, benefitsare based upon earnings unadjusted for subsequentprice increases,
In the case of private pensions,only a handful of planscurrentlhave a provision for adjusting pensions durwretirement for price levelchanges, Many plans in recent years haveadjusted periodically the benefitformula used to calculate benefits atthetime a retirenlenl_raisingbenefits oftenmore than necessary for compensating forprice level changes. Whileno systematic analysis by governmentor private researchers has beenmade to quantil'y andgeneralize the extent to which suchadjustments are occurring,one would not expect to find a very complete adjustment beingmade by private pensionsystems using various adhocprocedures, And certainlywe know that many plans,Unl'ortunately, do little or no adjustingat and/or during retirement
Finally, with regardto the third factor---.productivjtyor economic growth adjustment_the practice ofpresent pension systems isclear. Both the social security system andprivate pensions havedone very little toadjust pension levels in reurc,,,entto reflect the generaliniprovemerit in livingstandards over time. Thus, the current lackof dynamic adjustmentmechanisms in JJ.S.pension systems promises thecontinuation of a fundamentajretirement problem. Even if aged povertY_asdefined, f'orexample, by the SSApoverty indexwere to he eliminated, therewould still remain theproblem of' relatiucincome adequacy. Past public discussionsregarding aged incomeadequacy (and theadequacy of private and publicpensionprograms) have been dominatedby a search for%a%s of improving thepoverty or nearpoverty incomes of' theaged. More attention needs to be givento the question ofthe desirabilityof' creating pensionsystems which will not onlyprovide adequate'flininiu,,j oldage incomes but which will also provide theelderly withpensions which permitthem to maintainor more closely approachtheirpreretirement livingstandard in retirementand. perhaps. even improve upon it.
112Whether individuals wish to maintain or improve their standard of living in
retirement is, of course. still an open question. It is possible that somepeople
may prefer to reduce their living standard in oki ageif, as a result, they can live
better before retirement. And even for thoselio do desiie to maintain or improve
iiviflg standards in retirement, there still remains the question as to whetherthis
should be a matter ot' personal choice (and hence, personal savings) orwhether
the matter should be handled through the public andor privatepension systems.
In recent years the institutional pension mechanisms (both public andprivate)
in the United States and many other countries have comeunder heavy criticism.
Much of the criticism has centered around the adequacy ofbenefits realized and
the extent to which the pension systems are fulfilling the needs of"social adequacy"
at the expense of individual equity and publicpolicy efficiency.
For example, in a well-reasoned critique of the Americansocial security
systein---Pechman. Aaron. and Taussig (1968) have argued:
The basic dilemma in considering reform of the social security system is
that the United States has attempted to solve two problems with oneinstru-
ment--how to prevent destitution among the aged poor and how to assure to
people, having adequate incomes before retirement. benefits that arcrelated
to their previous standard of' ving. The earningsreplacement function calls
for benefit payments without an income test. Basic incomesupport, on the
other hand, can be carried out most efficiently if payments areconfined to
households with low income.
Two separate systems are needed to accomplish the twofunctions at
the lowest cost. The earnings replacement function shouldcontinue to be
performed by a social security system. Social security would becomestrictly
wage-related, with the replacement rate roughly the same atall earnings
levels between subsistence and the median earnings level.The income
support function should be transferred to a negative income tax system orto a
comprehensively reformed system of public assistance. With a goodnegative
income tax, dependents' allowances would be unnecessaryunder social
security. The payroll tax might be retained, but it should beused only as a
withholding mechanism for the individual income tax.
It is time that a broad review of the U.S. retirementincome maintenance
system was undertaken and serious thoughtgiven to the requirements of pro-
viding adequate retirement incomes forthe Jiilure aged.Present trends indicate
we must be prepared to deal with theeconomic implications of (a) ever increasing
living standards in the working years, (b) retirement at earlier ages,(c) longer life,
and (d) changing retirement life-style expectations.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS or Soc'mi SECURITY SYsm1s
ln recent years there have been numerous calls forresearch to evaluate and
build upon the social security experiences of various foreigncountries in the old
age income maintenance area. As early as1963, Margaret Gordon wrote that
"a promising method of inquiry that has been almosttotally neglected is com-
parative analysis of the impact of various types ofwelfare programs. including
old-age insurance programs. on the economy in variouscountries."
113More recently, the 1967 U.S. Social Security Advisory Coninijteconlalen ted
as follows:
A good deal of light could heshed on the issues invoIvc(lthrotuIi :Inal)S
of the rather wide variety of relationships among
iflCOn1Cflljfltenancc systems that have been developed in other industrialcountriesThere. income-conditioned pensions and payments not relatedto illCOfl)such a
universal old-age pensions and family allowances, existin varyingcomhjmi. tions with social insurance and public assistancesystems
Concurrent with these calls for research, anotherimportant development
has occurred. There have been developed andimplemented in anumber of industrialized countries a variety of' highly innovativesocial securitysystetits These new systems have been in large part motivatedby dissatisflict ion withthe existing programs of old age income maintenancein each country andhave attempted to overcome many of the existing problems.Public pension develop-
ments in Austria, West Germany, Sweden, and Canada.for example, havebeen watched with increasing interest.
There have been a few articles and bookswhich discuss the socialsecurity systems of various countries. In general thesestudies haveconcentrated on describing the laws guidingpast and present social securitysystems and in high- lighting the major historical developmentsand issues surrounding theseevolving systems. There islittle in the literature, however,to indicate how thesenew systems are working: the extent to which theyare [fleeting objectives; theeconomic effects on inconie distribution andsavings; their effectson private pension Systenis and the general satisfactionor dissatisfaction with them.
Important exceptions to this lackof study of foreignsystems are the works of Gordon (1963), Aaron(1967), Pryor (1968), Kreps (1968). and Rimlinger (1968). Gordon studied eighteenindustrial countries and founda significant correlation between the date ofestablishment of an old-agepension program fora sizeable segment of the population and thelevel of average benefitsmeasured as a per- centage of national per capitaincome. Aaron also studiedindustrialjze(j countries and found age ofprograms a major factor determiningthe size and adequacyof' social security outlays,and similar findingsare reported by Pryor. Krepsmakes international comparisons oflabor force activity andvariations in lcisure.timc patterns. Finally,a comparative analysis ofthe historical developmentof the social securitysystems in Germany. Russia.France, Great Britain.and the United States has beenrecently published byRimlinger. In most countrieswith highly developedsocial securitysystems (including the united States),at least five broadconcerns have dominatedrecent discussions with regard todeveloping satisfactorypublic systems of old-ageincome main- tenance. First, there isthe question of theappropriate public-privatepension mix and the effect ofdeveloping publicpension systems onpersonal and private institutional incomeprovision for old-age.Second, there is theproblem of how to insure adequateincomes for the agedpoor while maintaining the"integrity" of incomemaintenanceprograms for all incomegroups (i.e., maintaininga pro- gram which is equitable,financially viable,and without majoreconomic dis- incentives)Third, there hasbeen increasinginterest in providingfor middle- income groupspublic pensionbenefits which (withor without other income
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sources) would permit retired families to maintain a standard of living in 01(1
age which was very similar to that achieved during the latei years of the workers'
earnings period. Fourth, there is the question of the desirability of automatic
public pension adjustmen$s and the search for suitable adjustment mechanisms.
Finally, there is the question of what is the best way to finance a public income
maintenance program for the aged.
With regard to the question of pension adequacy, there has been a shift in
thinking away from accepting as the sole role of pensions the prevention of
poverty through providing minimum levels of benefits----the so-called "floor of
protection." Whether individuals can efTectively and efficiently handle the major
part of their retirement income planning is open to serious doubt, given historical
experience and the nature of the problem. Even assuming a new individual aware-
ness of the need for retirement preparation. a look at the uncertainties the mdi-
vidual has to deal with reveals the magnitude of the problem:
I. He does not know with certainty his time of death (or the time of death
of his spouse). Hence, he must assume the worst and presumably save for
age 100 (or more) or decide to go on public assistance (or perhaps seek
help from relatives) at a certain age. Thus arises one reason for public
and/or private retirement insurance. By pooling this risk, the cost of
protection from uncertainty is decreased.
He does not know with certainty what his future income stream will be.
He must protect himself from such hazards as ill health, cyclical economic
fluctuations, and job obsolescense. Again, a case for public and/or private
insurance arises (unemployment, disability, and medical insurance).
He does not know what his retirement needs will be. He cannot predict,
for example, his stateofhealth throughout the retirement period. Not
only does his health have a direct influence on medical costs, but it also
affects retirement mobility--influencing recreation and transpoitation
expenditures.
He does not know when he will retire. Although the individual has some
control over this, increasingly the decision is becoming institutionaliicd
with (1) the growth of mandatory retirement rules, (2) the growth o!early
retirement options (often accompanied by management and/or union
retirement pressures), and with (3) the continued existence of age dis-
crimination practices in hiring.
He cannot easily predict the future rateofinflation which, if it occurs,
will depreciate the value of his retirement assets and retirement income
from sources which do not adjust fully for this happening. Furthermore.
he cannot easily predict the rateofeconomic growth----which is likely to
affect his economic position re/alice to the working population.
Thus, as a result of these problems and others, private and public institutions
have been created to assist and in some cases to force changes (Musgrave, 1968) in
the individual's consumption-saving pattern. And with the developmentof
pension institutions and mechanisms has come the development of the concept
of an "adequate pension." Many countries now have public pension systems which
not only relate pension benefits to prior earnings but seek to guarantee through
these benefits a relatively high level of earnings replacement at retirement. The
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trend seems to be toward (ievelopng public (and alSo private) pensionsstcni'
which will he adequateenough to permit the retired population to at kitflliiint'in
a level of living which approximates that which they enjoyed hirintheir'.
years.
Social security benefits in the Lnited States (It) not currentlachieve this
objective. Nor have past discussions and debates about future benefitincreases
explicitly dealt with the tole of' earnines repiacenient ill determiningthe appro-
priate pension formulas. Thus, the 1971 Advisory ('ouncilon Social Security
observed and recommended:
While past and proposed legislative actions haveapproxiniately achievcd
the goal of maintenance of purchasing power, the replacementrates have
shifted over time and between different levels ofaverace wages 'Ihere hi
been insufficient analyses of public discussion of the role ofleplacenlent ra
in prescribing the benefit form ulas. If policy were formula tedin relation to
replacement rates, the method of calculating therate should be stated
precisely. A replacement rate derived fi'oia the relationshipheteethe
benefit and the average wage over tile entire period ofan individual's pai'ticipa
lion in the labor market will df1er niarkedly froma ratio of the benchto
his average wage in the 5 year period immediatelypreceding retirement
Careful study and serious consideration should be givenbefore establishing
a specific policy about replacement rates. However, the policshould be
explicit and not implicit as is inherentin the use of the level wageassunlphio)I1
Ti u Stxit LA liON MiTiiot)Oiz)(;y
if' we seek to change the socialsecurity system (or privatepension system) of'
any country, an important policy question arises:How will various changesin the pension mechanisms affectnot on lv the size of benefits hut alsothe distribution of benefits? Policy discussions ofsuch questions are usually basedipon highly
aggregate projections of pension benefitsand the total cost of suchreforms Utilizing the computer and simulationtechniques, however, the effects of'pension mechanism changescan be estimated at a micro-levelpermittinga much wider range of policy questions to heexamined, including the distributionaleffects ol' such changes. Inan earlier study (Schulz. 1968),f'or example. a modelwas developed to simulate U.S.public and private pensionsas they existed and \ere developing in tile late 60's,That study was ableto look at whether theeconomic circumstances of the retiredpopulation in the United Stateswould improve significantly in the near futureas a result of' the improvementS; in thesepension systems during the post-WorldWar II period The efThctsof increased coerage, beeflt formula changes,private pension vestingprovisions, and other tactors were investigated,
Using a simulationmodel, itis possible to lake anyproposed ciiiinge in a pension system and subjectit to estensive analysis, Thereare currently helre the U.S. Congress literallydozens of hills whichseek to changel)rivafc and public pensions in some basicway. Using simulationtechniques, the results ofmost of these changescan be examined andcomparisons can he made. 'l'hc 0111ccof' Research and Statisticsof the ti_S. SocialSecurity Adiiijmiistrjtjori kcurrently
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edeveloping a more detailed version of the modelreferred to above, to he used for
just such purposes.
A related use For simulation analysis inthe aged income maintenance area
is analysis ol' aet of alternative pen;ion niechanisins,such as they currently
exist in a particular country- Valuable insights canbe gained by studying the
systems of other countries. A project iscurrently under way at Brandeis University
to examine the economic implicationsfor the United States of its adopting pension
reforms similar to those in other countries.Currently simulation analysis is being
utilized to analyze West German. Swedish.and Canadian-type social secuilty
systems.
The simulation model used for this purposeis a modification of the model
developed by Schulz (1968) for simulatingthe U.S. pension system. The basic
data for the simulations are from a sampleof the U.S. population in 1960. This
sample, called the "one-in-a-thousandsample." is on a set of tapes producedby
the U.S. Bureau of the Census andcontains separate records of characteri.tics of
a 0.1 percent sample ofthe U.S. population as recorded in the1960 census. Each
record contains 40 coded characteristicsabout an individual- --including certain
demographic. work force, income, and familycharacteristic information.
From this sample are taken: (a) allmarried couples where the husband is
between 45 and 60 years of age (inclusive),and (b) all unmarried individuals
where the individual is between 45 and 60(inclusive). These persons constitute
the basic population which is "aged" intoretirement. -
In order to project pension incomeand assets of the retired aged,itis
necessary to construct a "lifeprocess" model which will permit thoseactivities
of individuals to be simulated which have animportant influence on pensions and
assets. These actities can be divided into the followingfour categories: (a) demo-
graphic. (b) work force and earnings, (c) status, and (d) asset accumulation.
For example. not everyone in 1960 between45 and 60 can be expected to
live at least 20 years. Hence the firstlife process aclivity considered in thesimula-
tion model is death. A probabilityof death for each particular year isspecified
for individuals based on their sex, race,and age. A random drawing fromthe
associated probability distribution is used todetermine whether an individual
will die or live that year. Similarly,probabilities are specified for other possible
occurrences built into the model:labor force exit and entry. job change,pension
coverage, vesting and unemployment.
Each possible "occurrence"specified in the model is treated in a manner
similar to the live-die occurrence--each personbeing considered in turn. By
sequential handling of the various occurrences,it is possible to make the con-
sideration of any one occurrence dependent uponoccurrences which werehandled
before it. For example, one possible occurrencefor a person in the work force is
a change of job. Theconsideration of this occurrence in thecomputer for a
particular individual is madeconditional on the outcome of the "leavework
force" occurrence considered before it.if the individual "left" the work force,
obviously there is no need to considerwhether he has changed jobs.
Once one year's simulation iscompleted, the individual. ii he survives,is
aged another year and the processimmediately repeated. This continuesuntil
the year 1980 is reached (that is,completion of 20 "passes" in the computer).
117S
Another individual is then considered,and the whole simulation
process repeated. After all individuals are processed,the resulting samplepopulationrepresents most of the future aged popuIationsince the surviving individualsare now 65 to 85 years of age.
During the simulatioti, earningshistories are kept foreach individual individuals in the simulation whowork full-time duringa particular yearand do not change jobs are givenan employment equal to their"wage level."Females who work part time receiveearnings equal to 50percent of their "wagelevel," Individuals (full or part time) inthe simulation whochange jobs inany particular year are subjectto a reduction of earningbecause of possibletime lost between jobs. In the simulation,a random number is generatedeach timea worker changes jobs. The probabilitiesof losing (a) no time,(b) I to 4 weeks,(c) 5 to 10 weeks, (d) 11 to 26 weeks,or (c) more than 26 weeksare estimated using Bureau of Labor Statistics data.Using the earningshistories generatedby the simulation process describedabove, pension benefitscan then be calculated. Account is taken of trends inpension coverage, privatepension vesting, and public and private pensionlevels.
Social security and privatepeflSiofl benefit levelsare assumed to riseat various designated rates whichcan be varied to test thesensitivity of thepension income distributions to suchassumptions. In thecurrent simulations.social security benefits are assumedto increase in the futureat an average annualrate of 4 per- cent. This assumption isquite liberal. It isa higher rate of increasethan has been voted by the Congressin the past.
The type of analysisbeing undertaken inthe projectcan be illustrated by describing the simulationof the set ofmechanisms used inthe West German social securitysystem.
SIMULATING A \VLSTGERMAN TYPE SOCIALSECURITY SYsTE1
The presentsystem was introducedin West Germanyin 1957 whenthe pension laws thenoperating underwentfundamental change.The changes which occurred in the"pension reform of1957" were notsmall incrementaladjustments to the old system;in effect the existingsystem was replaced bya radically different one.
The basic aim ofthe reformwas "to avoid toogreat a decrease in thestandard of living ofinsuredpersons at the end oftheir workinglives." Theamount of pension payable,therefore, is nolonger dependenton the actual contributions paid during theinsurance life, buton the earnings ofthe individualduring his working life inrelation toaverage earnings,as well as to the levelof wages and salaries at thetime the pensionbecomes "payable."(Zoilner, 1970). This dynamicprinciple whichunderlies thenew system is probablythe system's mostinteresting feature.The goal isto allow the retiredindividual to have a livingstandard roughlyequivalent to thatwhich is beingenjoyed by a current worker ofequivalentstatus. Equivalentstatus refers toa worker with current earningswhich bear thesame relationshipto mean nationalearnings as do the retiredworker's lifetimeaverage earningsto average nationalmean earnings (overthe same period).Thus, a workerwho onaverage received earnings
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which were, say, one and ahalf times mean nationalearnings would receive a
pension at retirement which wasequal to the earnings of the"equivaleflt' current
worker (reduced by the appropriatereplacement percentage).Given that earnings
over one's worklifetend to increase for manyworkers at a rate greaterhaii
national mean earningstheresulting pension calculated bythis inechauim
would often be lower than apension based on earningsjust prior to retirement.
The second basic feature ofthe West German systemis that the system is
based upon the principle thatpension benefits are deemed"adequate" to maintain
prior living standards only ifthey replace a high proportionof preretirerflei)t
earnings. Thus, the German systemexplicitly recognizes the needfor adequate
earnings replacement, not justthat pension benefit levelsshould be related to
earnings (or taxes paid). Tothis end, the pensionformula is set up so that regular
workers will receive between 60and 75 percent of preretirementearnings adjusted
for national price andproductivity increases.
The third. feature of the systemis that benefit levels arefurther adjusted in
relation to the number of yearsworked. Unlike the U.S. systemand most other
systems where therelationship between benefitamount and yearsworked is
minimal oilce the worker meetsthe minimum coveragequalificationsthe
German system benefit size isdirectly related to the numberof years worked, so
that a worker with only half as manyyears of work coveragereceives a pension
which is one-half as large asanother worker who is equal inall other respects.
The fourth feature of the Germansystem worthy of noteis the fact that no
spouse benefits are paid.Wives who work get a pensionbased upon their earnings
and number of yearsworked. But families withoutworking wives, which were
exclusively dependent beforeretirement on the earningsof one bread-winner,
receive a pension for retirementbased upon his earnings alone.This is consistent,
of course, with the basicprinciples of the system and ispossible without creating
extreme hardship forcouples because of therelatively high pension levels.here,
and in other ways, the Germanshave attempted to clearlyseparate traditional
welfare/redistributiVe objectives frompensions based on the "self-helpprinciple."
The fifth feature of specialinterest isthe dynamic adjustmentof German
pension levels during retirement.Initially, these adjustments werenot adjusted
automatically but instead by annuallegislative review after therecommendations
of an advisory council wereannounced. In reality, the pensionsof retired persons
have been adjusted by thelegislature every year bythe process specified inthe
social security lawa time lagged wageindex. Therefore, itis generally agreed
by pension experts in Germanytoday that tite system is andwill be adjusted (for
all practical purposes) in anautomatic fashion. Certainly thepension adjustment
process in no wayresembles the ad hoc processin use in the United States.
The effect of the German featuresdescribed above are investigatedby pro-
jecting the individual pensions,pension distributions, andpensionearniflgS
ratios which would result in theU.S. if the West German systemof social security
were introduced in placeof the current OASDI program.The pension system for
Americans is simulated using theWest German old age pensionmechanisillS.
The results of the Germansimulation (a census of all sampleindividuals) are
stored on tape in a manner thatwill permit retrieval in aflexible manner. In this
way, all basic outputdata are available on one tapefor future tabulationand
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analysis purposes. Inaddition, a set of basictables are tabulatedand storedon another tape. In theGerman case, these tablesrepresent the VarIOUSpossible combinations (2,016 tables) ofthe key variables listedbelow: I. Three alternativemeasures of preretiremenirarnings.
"Social security pensionsonly'' or "all pensionincome" (publicand private).
Alternative German formulaconstants (0015 or 0.001I). Three alternative definitionsof "work history."
Present U.S. versusGermantype pensions.
The total U.S. populationor only the nonagriculturalpopulation. Couples, widowedwomen, single men, andwomen "never married." A set of 53 of thesetables were selectedand have beenprinted for theinitial analysis phase. As theproject progresses andfurther questionsor areas of inquiry arise, additional tablescan easily he retrieved andprinted.
SIMULATION FINDINGs
What would thedistribution of socialsecurity old-agepension look likein the year 1980 if theWest Germansystem were used in theUnited States?Table I summarizes the simulationestimations for unitsage 65 or more whoare total/i' retired from thework force.
Looking at TableI. one is immediatelystruck by thevery high pensions which would bepaid by thistype of system. Inevery categoryexcept that for women who nevermarried, the pensionspaid arc twoto four timeshigher than social securitybenefIts currentlypaid. In thecase of couples, 70percent of the units are projectedto have benefits of$5,000 ormore; furthermore,20 percent are projected to havesocial securitybenefits exceeding$10,000. Thedistribution for singlemen and widowedwomen indicatesa lower proportionof relatively high pensions,but evenamong these units,there are abouthalf with pensions equal to orgreater than S5,000.
As was explainedpreviously, thecurrent Germansocial securityold-age pension systemdoes not havea minimum benefitprovision. Povertyproblems are dealt with bya separatesystem administeredprimarily bystate and local governmental units.Therefore, it isnot surprisingto find somevery low pension recipients in Table1. For example,18 percent ofthe couplesand 35. 32, and 84 percent ofsingle men,widowedwomen, andwomen whonever married (respectively)are projected tohave socialsecurity benefitsunder 53.000.The large proportionof "nevermarried"women withoutbenefits or withvery low benefits isexplained by thefact thatmany have littleor no work historywhich would qualifythem fora large pension.One mustremember that theWest German systempays pensions whoseamounts are directlyrelated to thenumber
of yearsworked.
Using thesimulationprojections,we can comparesocial securitypensions
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percentage distribution]
If wife retired, pension is sumof husband and wife'spension. if wile not retired.
husband pension only is used: ifhusband not retired. unitectuded from calculation
Never married or widowed men.
Less than 0.5 percent
In the simulation, it isassumed that all menqualify for OASDI pensionS
in er:ns oJ'lime;women, however, aretested for pensioneligibility based
upon theirstimulation and pre-stimulatiOnwork histories.
"Creditable" earnings forpension calculation purposeswas assumed to
be similar to the WestGerman system(two times the averagenational
earnings of the threepreviOUs years) and were notassumed to be limited
by the lower ceilingschedule of the currentU.S. law.
The earnings historiesfor the years before1959 are based uponestimates
described in Appendix A.
Social security benefits areassumed to rise at an averagerate of 4 percent
per year in thefuture as a result ofvariousad hocincreases authorized
by the Congress andthe President.
Widows' benefits arecalculated as 100 percentof their husbands'earned
benefits.
Table 2 presents a comparisonof the projected 1980U.S. and German-type
social security pensiondistributions for couples,single men, andwidowed
women. The tablegives a dramatic comparisonof the generally staticAmerican
social security systemwith low earnings replacementgoals versus a systemwith
higher replacementgoals and adjustment featureswhich take into accountthe
dynamic factors of bothprice level changes andreal economic growth incalculating
benefits at retirement.
Of course, the differencein the cost of the twosystems is equallydramatic.
To estimate the relativecosts, the individualpensions amounts making upthe
pension distribution wereaggregated. It was found thatthe \Vest German system
costs would be 2.2times greater than the costsol' the U.S. system.However, if
the replacement levelgoal of the present WestGerman system werelowered (by
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See lootnotes I and 2 ofTable I
Less than (3.5 percent.
reducing theconstant used in thebenefit calculationformula), thecosts would drop accordingly.
REPlACEMENT RATES
If weassume that earnings priorto retirement isa good proxy fora family's level or standardoflivingbeforeretiremenUthen theratio of a family'spension income topreretirement earningsis one usefulindicator ofretirement income adequacy. Using thismeasure, one can geta good indication ofthe extent towhich pensions. in thiscase social securitypensions. replaceearnings lost byretirement and. therefore.of the amountofsupplemental effortrequired by theindividual in order to maintaina standardofliving similarto the one experiencedbefore retirement.
In artotliei-paper, I have discussed
extensively variousmeasures of the "pre- retirement standardof living"(Schulz, 1971),Theamount of financialresources required variesconsiderably.dependingupon themeasure ofthe preretirenient standard used.Three basictypes ofmeasures are embodiedin various different social securityprograms today:(a) theaverage of lifetimeearnings. (b) the average of a certainnumber of thebestyears of earning, and(c) an average ofa certain numberof thelastyears worked. Inthis study, thelatter method,which uses the final workears as themeasureofthe standardof living, isused. Three different setsofprojectionsare made --usingthe lastyear. the last fireyears. and
the lastten years beforeretirement,respectively. Onlythe projectionsusing the
"last tenyears" measureare discussed inthis paper. Table 3Presents thepension-earningsratio distributionsfor the various demographicgroups. It is importantto note that inaddition to thefact that the
ratios werecalculated usingan average ofthe last tenyears of earnings inthe
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peiceflta(C III strihutioti]
Couples' Singk Men' Widoaed Income U S (iernian U.S.German U.S.
Women
German
Total prcni On I Dl) 100 I 00 lOU 100 Less than 52.000 23 13 52 47 26 S.000 2.999 28 5 39 6 4' 6 53,000 3.999 27 6 9 6 6 7 54,000 4,999 17 7 0 7 0 9 55.000 5.999 6 9 0 8 0 II 56.000 6.999 (21 13 0 14 1) 10 S7.000 7.999 10 0 8 0 9 58.000-8.999 I> ID 0 6 (1 6 S9Ji00-9.999 0 8 0 6 0 5(0.000I (.909 (( 14 0 10 0 7 SI 2.000 or more 0 6 0 2 13 5TABLE 3
PRuircuD RAl10 AlRi;riREsu:'oS&ti.i. SruuRi ivI'rNSION Ic1)sIi:
TO PRLRIJIREMENTEARNINGS'. 1315W LJNJN A GERSIAN-ivirSsii,i
[percentage distri hution
Average of ten years prior to retirement.
2 Includes pci sons receiving no pension but ssith some earnings in the relevant years.
See footnotes I and 2 of Table I.
' Ratio based upon dead husbands earnings (if appropriate) and own earnings (if
any).
denominator, the pension used in the numerator is thesimulated pension received
by each individual in the first year of retirement (between1960 arid 1979) and not
the 1980 pension (which is higher because of the 4 percentannual benefit increase
assumed in the study). As in the previous tables showing theprojected distribu-
tion of income, only social security old-age pensions areincluded. Estimates
which include projected private pensions were alsomade but are not discussed.
In evaluating the results presented in Table 3, we can use twobenchmark
measures: (a) the proportion of unitswith a pension-earnings ratio below 0.50
and (b) the proportion of units with a ratio above 0.60. Thesebenchmarks are
used because "in the United States, some social planners currentlyspeak of an
assured flow of income of probably 50 percent of the earnings of recent years
not the lifetime earningsfor a single worker and66-70 percent for a couple"
(Horlich, 1970). In the case of couples, nearly three-quarters(74 percent) are
projected as having a ratio of 0.60 or higher. Only 14 percentreceive pensions
amounting to less than 50 percent of their earnings and. as wewill show below.
most of these couples have very high earnings(probably above the social security
earnings ceiling). The proportion of single units with a ratioof 0.60 or more varies
froma high of 93 percent for single men to alow of 26 percent for women who
never marriedwith female widows beingin-between with 43 percent.
Of course, any pension system can provide very highbenefits with the appro-
priate formula specification. What is unusual and, I would argue,desirable about
the German system (and certain other European systems)is that its formula
explicitly embodies are/aliveconcept or definition of income adequacy by
guaranteeing long term workers a relatively high earningsreplacement rate
consistent with historical price level changes and rising realearnings levels-
irregardless of ;t'Iiat those changes night be in the unforeseen future.
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Total percent 00 100 lOU 100
Less than 0.202 2 0 19 19
0.20 to 0.29 2 I 5 17
0.30(0 0.39 4 I 7 19
0.4OtoO.49 6 2 12 12
0.50 (00.59 12 4 IS 7
0.6OtoO.69 21 12 16 S
0.70(00.79 29 32 14 3
0.8OtoO.89 17 31 9 2
0.90 (01)99 4 12 3 2
l.Oormore 3 6 14I
Contrast the pension-earnings ratio resulting froma (ierman_tpeSVSIej,i with those resulting from the current U.S.system. Whereas theierivanlype system results in very few couples with a pension-earningsratio below O.S()the current U.S. social security systemvill ieult iiialmost all 0! thesaiiCOupIcs receiving a social security pension at retirementwhich will he less thanSo percent of their prior average earnings.
CoNcLvnJx(; OBSERVATIONS
To a large extent, pension benefit levels inthe past and theincreases iii these levels have been stimulatednot so much with the purposefulintent oftapping a greater part of the nation's rising nationalproduct for old people hutrather as a secondary result of attempts to dealwith the severe andpotentiiIly explosje hardship problems facingmany older people. Inconsequence, these pastefforts have been aimed primarilyat raising the economicstatus of the agedto some minimum standard or subsistencelevel in the fiuce of risingprices.
What has been proposed bysome, however, is to developmechaiisms which allow the retired aged to sharein the growingproductivity andoutput of the nationto share insome of' the "harvested fruits.What this no doubtrequires is the development ofmeans to permit an orderly,equitable hut of income from the workingto the retired population inorder to improvethe latter's relative economicstatus. The national dialogueand debate oversuch a change of focus withregard to developing betterretirement incomeprograns is just beginning.
Simulation analysis providesa flexible tool for evaluatingvarious important economic implications ofalternative social securityreform proposalsIts useful. ness in American policy discussionsis reflected in thewidespread interest which the results of the Orcutt,Pcchman, and Schulzsimulations havegenerated among American politicans,government analysts, andacademics working in theincome maintenance field. It isno accident that the Officeof' Economic Opportunity,the U.S. Treasury, andthe Social SecurityAdministration havecooperated and encourage these projects.





Age of Entering the Labor force (A GEN1) in the German Sisiem
In previous simulations, AGENT was assumed to he 20 years of age. In this
simulation, the age was kept variable with the years of schooling received. The
relationship between the years of schooling and the age is as follows:
AGENT TIpe o/schooling receired an(I conpIt'ied
15 High school, grade 10. or less schooling
16 High school, grade II
17 High school, grade 12
19 College. three years, or less college
21 College, for years, completed
25 + N College. live years. or more.
In the case of five or more years of college, a normally distributed random
variate was generated and added to the value 25 of AGENT. The variate N had
a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Consequently,the average age
generated was 2D years, and approximately all cases generated 99.7 percent fell
within the interval of 22 years to 28 years. The "type of schooling" used for
estimating was based upon the 1960 census information.
Wage History of Indiru/ua/s (WA GE)
In the absence of a detailed knowledge of wage histories ofindividuals in
different trades and occupations, a method was developed to generate these wages
for the years 1940 to 1959based on the individuals' recorded wages for1960.
Using national wage averages, a linear regression line was fitted according
to the least squares criterion. The slope of theregression was found to be $144.5
per year. In the simulation an individual'srecorded wage for 1960 was successively
reduced by this amount to give his deflated wages for the years1959 to 1940.
In order to introduce variation, a normally distributed randomvariate N
with mean zero and standard deviation of 5.8 was added to the deflatedvalue;
consequently, almost all variations (99.7 percent) ranged between - 17.4 and17.4.
In other words, the 1960 recorded wage of an individual was successivelyreduced
by an amount normally distributed within the limits of $127.1 and $161.9 per year.
In the above scheme, the minimum wage permissible was $500 per year.and
the maximum was not allowed to exceed a value twice the averageof the last
three years of the national wage averages. In addition to the 1960 recorded wage.
the status of employment and the last year of work were known.Accordingly.
the annual wage was set to zero when an individual had not worked.
German Pensions (GP)
The calculation of German pensions can be readily understood by following
these steps:
(a) At the year of retirement, the general earnings base (GB) is defined as






























tsDeparting from the practice in Germany, three factors to adjust the
general earnings base were calculated. These factors are defined as the
average of the prior ten, twenty. orlifetime ratios of an
annual earnings to the national wage averages. In Germany, the average
of all (i.e., lifetime) ratios of wages to national wave averages are calcu-
lated.
Given these three factors, the general earnings base is multiplied to form
three (as opposed tone) personal earnings bases (P1310. P820. and
PBLI FE).
Given the personal earnings base---the number of' years worked and the
age at retirement minus the age of entering the workforce were deter-
mined.
In this simulation two legal constants (LCON) were used to give weight
to the number of years worked. Presently in Germany this constant is
0.015 for every year worked. In the simulation the constant 0.0111was
also used.
Given three personal earnings bases and two legal Constants, six dif-
ferent pensions were calculated. These pensions were obtained by
multiplying the personal earnings base with the number of years worked
and with the legal constant.
B tilt tOG RAI'IIY
Aaron, Henry, "Social Security: International Comparisons.'' in Otto Eckstcin (ed.) Studies in the
Econrnnic.c of income Maintenance (Washington: Brookings institution.967).
Advisory Council on Social Security. The Reports of the /97/ Ath'Lsory Council on Social Securit;,
Communication From Secretary of Health. Education and Vctfare, house Docuiiieiit No. 92.80
92nd Congress. 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1971).
I3oulding, Kenneth. Principles of Economic Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1958).
Gordon. Margaret. The Et'onwnics of Welfare Policies (New York: Columbia University Press,1963)
-. "Income Security Programs and the Propensity to Retire." in Richard H. Williams, ci. ui.
eds.. f'rocesses of Aging, Vol.2 (New York: Atherton Press. 1963).
Heidbreder. Elizabeth, Kolodrubetz, W. %V., and Skolnik, Alfred, "Old Age Programs,"in U.S.
Joint Economic Comminee, Old Age Income Assurance. Pt. Ii (\Vashington, D.C.: U.S.Govern-
ment Printing 0111cc, 1966).
Horlich, Max. "The Earnings Replacement Rate of Old-Age Benefits: An InternationalComparison,"
Social Security Bulletin. Vol. 33 (1970).
Kreps,Juanita, LJethnc Allocation of hl'ork and Leisure, U.S. Social SecurityAdministration, Research
Report No. 22(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968).
Musgrave. Richard. "The Role of Social Insurance inan Overall Program for Social Welfare." in
Howen, ci. al., The Anu'ru'an 5t's'ni / Socia/ ln.suranrt'(New \I)rk -Mc(jraw-Ilill, 1968).
Orcutt, G. H. I'it'w.c on S,niu/atio,, and timlels o/Social.Si,stc,us, Social Systems Research Institute
Reprint No. 61 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,1964).
Pechinan, .Ioseph A., Aaron, Henry J., andTaussig. Michael Social Sc near: Pcrspeciivt's /cr Refarin
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,1965).
Pryor, Frederick. Public E.vpi'ndituresin Cmnmunist sz,:cl Capita/it \cliions (}lomcsood, Illinois:
Irwin, 1968).
Rimlinger, CiastOn. "Social Change and SocialSecurity a (.ieririany.'' 1/cc' Journal oJl!unicin Resources,
Ill (Winter, 1968).
Schulz, James. "Aged RetirementIncome AdequacySimulation Projections of Pension.Earnings
Ratios,in U.S. Joint Economic Committee. 0/il Age Income.1ssura,ue. Pi. 2 (Vashinton, D.C.:
U.S. Gos crnment Printing 001cc, 1967).
Thit' E oflinnlL Status 0/ the RetiredAged in J9,stj Simulation Prcijeciuni.s, Research Report
No. 24, Office of Research andStatistics, Social Security .'dii1inistration (Washington. D C.:



























---"The Role of' Sas'ings and Pension Systems in Maintaining Liviiig SLaudards in Rettremeiit
Journal of ilunuin Re.vouri-e (scheduled for publication. 197 I ).
U.S Serta te Special Conirnittee on Aging. Eioninnii-.s of ..1jjm' : 7,t aid a fill .Sirt' en .1 l,iinilience
(Washington. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Match 1969).
U.S. Social Scurity Adsisor Committee. 71w Rc.eareh !'rogrun: of the- Se-a! .Se-e ur!t.ldn,lmfretr!n.
Report of the 1967 SSA Advisory Committee on Research Development (Washington. L).(':
Government Printing Office. 196$).
Zoefiner, Detlev. Sm-ia! Li-giafotwn inl7ie- Federal Republic uJ Gerinanr. 2nd revised ed.I Bonu:
Asgard-Verlag GMBII. 1970).
127